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This paper considers the allocation of two types of individuals differentiated by levels of 
talent within and between two countries when they choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. 
The equilibrium with international migrations requires both countries to be sufficiently 
different in talent endowments and is consistent with individuals moving in one or in both 
directions whether they are entrepreneurs or workers. Average welfare per capita falls in the 
country losing highly talented individuals and rises in the country attracting them. However, 
in both countries, the liberalization of migrations for immigrants, emigrants or both is always 
supported by majority voting. 
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The paper investigates a two-country model of one- and two-way international migrations
of individuals di⁄erentiated by levels of talent and working in a single industry. During the
last 20 years, migrations of skilled labor have increased signi￿cantly (OECD, 2001) and they
are now in￿ uencing the size and the structure of several industries. This phenomenon has
become su¢ ciently widespread and multi-faceted that it is now often described as ￿ brain
circulation￿(Johnson and Regets, 1998). In North America for instance, an average of about
29,000 individuals migrated yearly from the US to Canada between 1997 and 2002 while
about 73,000 individuals moved in the other direction.1 Although these ￿ ows are small
with respect to population, evidence suggests that these migrants are highly skilled in terms
of education or income (Gera et al., 2004). They are mostly concentrated in professions
like managers, executives, engineers, scientists and entrepreneurs, and work predominently
in knowledge-based industries like services and information technology.2 Zucker and Darby
(1995, 1999) have documented the ￿ ows of star scientists across borders and how these highly
talented individuals have shaped the biotechnology industry in its early stages.3 E⁄orts to
attract foreign software specialists in Germany, return migrations to India and to China are
other examples of the growing importance of talent for many industries. Clearly, economists
should investigate brain circulation.
To address this issue, we consider a model with two key components. First, individuals
working in a given industry are di⁄erentiated according to talent (skill or ability), which
for our purpose is treated as exogenous. Second, all individuals choose to be workers or
entrepreneurs. This determines wage and the number of ￿rms (i.e., entrepreneurs). Because
1See Gera et al. (2004) and Harris (2004). A large proportion of these ￿ ows are temporary migrating
professionals bene￿ting from NAFTA-TN visas.
2OECD (2002) reports that ￿ a quarter of Silicon Valley ￿rms in 1998 were headed by immigrants from
China and India and collectively created 52￿ 300 jobs and generated almost USD17 billion in sales￿ .
3For example, during the 1990s, they identi￿ed 417 star bioscientists worldwide; the US attracted 26 of
them and lost 20 while Canada, Switzerland and the UK had a net total loss of 19, despite attracting 9
(Zucker and Darby, 1999).
1individuals di⁄er in talent levels, the model exhibits increasing returns to entrepreneur￿ s
ability. Accordingly, ￿rms may be di⁄erentiated in terms of size and pro￿tability. Migrations
modify directly the industry structure and indirectly by in￿ uencing who is entrepreneur. The
model then allows us to analyze whether a country wishes to liberalize migrations of talented
individuals.
Restricting the analysis to two types of talent, the paper makes four points. First,
migrations require the countries not only to be di⁄erent but to be su¢ ciently so. Second,
the equilibrium can exhibit two-way or one-way international migrations by talent types
and because migrations involve both workers and entrepreneurs, migrations can also be
expressed with respect to activities. Third, migrations impact the number, the size and
the distribution of ￿rms. Finally, although countries with di⁄erent talent endowments have
generally con￿ icting incentives about migrations based on average welfare per capita, they
always choose to allow migrations when such a decision is taken by majority voting. This is
true whether migration policy is about immigrants, emigrants or both.
The literature on international mobility of skilled individuals has traditionally investi-
gated the impact of the loss of human capital and of the loss of returns to public investments
in training. We ignore these issue reviewed by Bhagwati and Wilson (1989). Treating tal-
ent as exogenous, we also ignore how migrations can a⁄ect human capital formation (Stark,
2003). This paper is related to Rauch (1991) who uses Lucas (1978)￿ s model of agent￿ s choice
of activity. However Rauch sets the choice of activity in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model
to investigate the links between patterns of trade and migrations. To concentrate on the
patterns of migrations and on industry structure, our model has only one sector. Several
articles have considered the role of talent and entrepreneurs in international trade. Among
them, Manasse and Turrini (2001) look at trade in products di⁄erentiated by quality where
quality depends on entrepreneur￿ s skill. Grossman (1984) investigates how opening a coun-
try to trade or to FDI a⁄ects the choice of becoming entrepreneurs when entrepreneurship
involves risk. These papers however do not consider international migrations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, the basic structure of the model
2is laid out and the equilibrium without migrations is derived. The di⁄erent pattern of
migrations are analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, we consider welfare and whether these
countries allow migrations to occur. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model and Equilibrium without Migration
The model is based on Lucas (1978) and Murphy et al. (1991). Consider two countries, A
and B, trading freely one homogeneous good but with no international migration. There are
two types of talent in the population of each country, [￿1;￿2] with ￿1 < ￿2. The number of
individuals with talent ￿1 (￿2) in country i is ’i
1 ￿ 0 (respectively, ’i
2 ￿ 0). The population
is fully employed and each individual can always choose to be either a worker or an entrepre-
neur. A ￿rm is de￿ned as an entrepreneur with talent ￿j (j = 1;2) and employs workers at
wage wi. Talent measures how an entrepreneur exploits the country-speci￿c technology ￿i






where p is the output price and f(l); the production function for l workers employed by the
￿rm. We assume f(:) is the same in both countries and exhibits decreasing marginal labor
productivity. The labor and the output markets are competitive in both countries. With free
trade, the output price is given and identical in both countries. Without loss of generality,
we set p = 1 and assume that f(l) = l
1
2:













4The fact that talent matters only for entrepreneur is without consequence; what is important is that the
returns to entrepreneurs￿talent increases relative to alternative occupations.
3Hence, ￿rm size, measured by employment, and pro￿t decrease with higher wages and in-
crease with talent because revenue increases with talent but not cost. Increasing returns to
talent induce individuals to become entrepreneurs on two counts: they earn higher pro￿t for
a given ￿rm size and they spread their talent over a larger ￿rm scale.
The individual￿ s decision to be a worker or an entrepreneur is based on the higher return
of the two activities. Since pro￿t increases with ￿j, there are three possible talent allocations:
some (but not all) ￿1-individuals are entrepreneurs; all ￿1-individuals are workers and all ￿2-
individuals are entrepreneurs (specialization by talent); and some (but not all) ￿2-individuals
are entrepreneurs.
Each of these cases is valid under di⁄erent parameter values. Since ￿1-individuals can be
entrepreneurs and workers in the ￿rst case, they must be indi⁄erent between the two activities
and pro￿t must equal wage. From (3), b ￿
i(￿1) = b wi =
￿i￿1






Thus there are two groups of ￿rms in terms of size and pro￿tability. The larger and more
pro￿table ￿rms are headed by ￿2-entrepreneurs and the smaller and less pro￿table ￿rms
are headed by ￿1-entrepreneurs. The proportion of ￿1-individuals who are entrepreneurs in
country i (￿
i
1) is determined by the equilibrium in the labor market. Since workers are only
found among ￿1-individual, the supply of workers is Li
S = (1 ￿ ￿
i
1)’i
1. Using (2) and given

























￿1)2]. Since 0 < ￿
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there are relatively few ￿2-individuals. We call it the ￿ few-talent case￿ .
In the second case where there is specialization by talent, all ￿1-individuals are workers
and all ￿2-individuals are entrepreneurs. Hence, the labor supply is equal to ’i
1 and the



























. Thus, all the ￿rms have the same size and
pro￿tability but wage and pro￿t now directly depend on the ￿1- and ￿2-population. This










1 < 1: There are now relatively more ￿2-individuals than in the ￿rst case
and we call it the ￿ intermediate case￿ .
4In the third case, ￿2-individuals can be entrepreneurs or workers and must be indi⁄erent
between the two activities (b wi = b ￿
i(￿2)). All workers (be they ￿1 or ￿2) have the same
wage b wi =
￿i￿2
2 and all the ￿rms are identical in size and pro￿tability. The proportion of
entrepreneurs in the ￿2-population (￿
i
2) is determined by the labor market equilibrium and












1 > 1) and we call it the ￿ many-talent case￿ .
De￿ning earnings by type of individuals (i.e., Gi
0(￿1), Gi
0(￿2)), relative earnings for each



























































Except for the intermediate case, the equilibrium earnings are independent of the relative
number of ’j-individuals. Keeping in mind that, although ￿1-individual￿ s earnings could be
￿rm￿ s pro￿t (as in the few-talent case), it always represents wage since there are always
workers among ￿1-individuals. Similarly, although ￿2-individual￿ s earnings could be wage, it
always represents pro￿t. Fig.1a and 1b illustrate (4) and the easiest way to interpret them
is thus to consider Gi
0(￿1) as wage and Gi
0(￿2) as pro￿t.
In the ￿rst case, since ￿1-individuals are relatively numerous, the wage is low relative to
pro￿t. When there are relatively more ￿2-individuals (the intermediate case), the smaller
and less pro￿table ￿rms disappear and all entrepreneurs are ￿2-type. As the relative size
of the ￿2-population rises, the number of ￿rms increases, the demand for labor rises and
so does the equilibrium wage. With costs rising, ￿rm pro￿tability and size shrink. In the
many-talent case, wage and pro￿t are identical, and the demand for labor is su¢ ciently high
for some ￿2-individuals to be workers. As a result, wage is the highest and pro￿t is the lowest
of the three cases.
Fig.1c shows employment per ￿rm and Fig.1d, the proportion of entrepreneurs (or ￿rms)
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Fig.1dincreases. This is because, although the number of ￿rms with ￿2-entrepeneurs rises, the
number of ￿rms with ￿1-entrepreneurs falls even more. Supply and demand of labor remain
constant however and wage is constant. This means that, on average, ￿rms are becoming
bigger with ’i
2=’i
1 rising. As soon as all the less e¢ cient ￿rms have disappeared, the wage
starts increasing as the number of ￿rms with ￿2-entrepreneurs keeps rising. As a result, em-
ployment per ￿rm falls. When ’i
2=’i
1 > 1; the proportion of entrepreneurs in the population
remains constant and so are wages and pro￿ts.5 Since the average employment per ￿rm is
now the lowest of the three cases, there is a relatively large number of small ￿rms.
Even though quite simple, the model generates three distinct cases where pro￿t, wage,
￿rm size and the number of ￿rms are di⁄erent. We now set the model in a two-country
environment with international mobility to investigate the patterns of migrations and their
e⁄ects on activity choices.
3 Equilibria with Migrations
To concentrate on migration patterns, we assume that the two countries use the same tech-
nology (￿A = ￿B = 1). Then, in our model, a di⁄erence in talent endowments is not su¢ cient
to generate migrations. For example, the two countries could be di⁄erent while both be-
longing to the few-talent case without migrations happening. This is so because earnings
are the same for both types of individuals across the two countries. To generate migrations,
the two countries should be su¢ ciently di⁄erent (i.e., belong to di⁄erent cases or be both








2 < 1). Then, Fig.1a
and 1b show that ￿1-individuals, relatively abundant in B, may have an incentive to migrate
to A because of earnings di⁄erential. Conversely, ￿2-individuals, relatively abundant in A,











1) < 0 and @2(Ni=hi)=@(’i
2=’i
1)2 > 0. In the intermediate case, the number of ￿rms
is Ni = ’i
2 so that @(Ni=hi)=@(’i
2=’i
1) > 0 and @2(Ni=hi)=@(’i
2=’i






2, Ni=hi = 1=2.
6may have an incentive to migrate to B. While this pattern of migrations is standard, the
fact that two-way migrations can be evaluated not only for types of individuals but also for
activities is interesting. This is so because, as shown in Section 2, in few-talent country B,
￿1-individuals are both workers and entrepreneurs and have an incentive to migrate. Simi-
larly for country A with respect to ￿2-individuals. Hence, the model can generate two-way
migrations among workers and entrepreneurs and two questions require further analysis.
First, what are the circumstances under which one-way or two-way migrations between A
and B occur? Second, how do the two countries compare in the migration equilibrium and
what are the possible outcomes?
Assume that c1 (respectively, c2) is the migration cost of a ￿1- (￿2-) individual. Clearly,
migrations will occur only when, in the equilibrium without migrations, earnings net of mi-
gration costs is higher in the destination country than earnings in the country of origin. Given
the migration pattern described above, we denote by x ￿ 0 the number of ￿1-individuals
(workers and entrepreneurs) who migrate from B to A and by y ￿ 0, the number of ￿2-
individuals who migrate from A to B. These individuals have an incentive to move (x > 0;









0 (￿1) > 0; (5)
NG0(￿2) = [G
B
0 (￿2) ￿ c2] ￿ G
A
0 (￿2) > 0: (6)








B(￿1) = 0; (7)
NG(￿2) = [G
B(￿2) ￿ c2] ￿ G
A(￿2) = 0; (8)
since individuals must be indi⁄erent between net earnings in the destination country and
earnings in the country of origin.
Another possible outcome is one-way migration. If it is from B to A (x > 0; y = 0),
(5) and (7) still hold but (6) and (8) must be negative or equal to zero and conversely for
one-way migration from A to B (x = 0; y > 0 when (6) and (8) hold and (5) and (7)
7￿ 0). The conditions (5) and (6) indicate immediately that two-way migrations necessitate
relatively low migration costs with respect to the talent (or productivity) di⁄erential (i.e.,
c1 < [￿2 ￿ ￿1]=2 and c2 < [￿2=￿1][￿2 ￿ ￿1]=2) and thus that one-way migration requires one
of the migration costs to be relatively high. If these conditions are necessary, they are not
su¢ cient (we have ignored (7) and (8)). We now characterize the migration equilibria more
precisely, especially the two-way migration equilibrium.




1 +x < ￿A
0




1 ￿x > ￿B
0 . Suppose ￿rst migrations make A and B more
alike by bringing both countries in the intermediate-case space (￿B
0 < (￿1=￿2)
2 < ￿B < 1
and (￿1=￿2)
2 < ￿A < 1 < ￿A



















Proposition 1 Two-way migrations (x > 0; y > 0), such that countries A and B fall in the




1 +2c1￿1). In this equilibrium, the
migration cost for ￿1-individuals is lower than for ￿2-individuals and the two countries are
never identical (￿B < ￿A).
Proof. Observe from (4) that Gi(￿1)Gi(￿2) = [￿2=2]
2 (i = A;B), so that (8) can be
rewritten as c1￿
2
2=4c2 = GA(￿1)GB(￿1). In the intermediate case with migrations, this last
equality and (7) become respectively
p
￿Ap




￿B = n1 where
n1 = 2c1=￿2 and n2 = 2c2=￿2. Solving these two equations,
p
￿A = (1=2n2)[n1n2 +
p
(n1n2)2 + 4n1n2]; (9)
p
￿B = (1=2n2)[￿n1n2 +
p
(n1n2)2 + 4n1n2]: (10)
Hence, ￿B < ￿A. Since 0 < ￿A < 1, 0 <
p
￿Ap
￿B = n1=n2 < 1 and c2 > c1 > 0. Moreover,





￿A < 1. With (9) and (10), the ￿rst inequality leads to n2 > n1=(1￿n1)
and the second to (￿1=￿2)2 +n1(￿1=￿2) < n1=n2. Together they de￿ne the su¢ cient range of
c2 over which two-way migrations hold when A and B fall in the intermediate case.
8In addition to be low relative to the talent di⁄erential, the two migration costs must be
relatively similar but they cannot be identical. Since at least one migration cost is positive,
the two countries cannot become identical with two-way migrations. To understand why
c1 and c2 are di⁄erent, consider Fig.1a,b. In equilibrium, the di⁄erence between C
0 and D
0
(equal to c2) is greater than the di⁄erence between C and D (equal to c1). This comes from
the property that, in the intermediate case, G(￿2) is more sensitive than G(￿1) to a change
in ’i
2=’i
1.6 This arises because a di⁄erence in wage between A and B must translate into a
more than proportional di⁄erence in pro￿ts since a higher wage lowers pro￿t directly and
indirectly through a smaller ￿rm size.






























￿A ￿ ￿B and y =
￿A￿B(’A
1 + ’B
1 ) ￿ (￿A’B
2 + ￿B’A
2 )
￿A ￿ ￿B :
Since workers and entrepreneurs have the same incentive to migrate among ￿1-individuals
in B and among ￿2-individuals in A, x and y include both workers and entrepreneurs. Hence,
this equilibrium is consistent with two-way migrations of both entrepreneurs and workers.
Observe however that some migrants switch activity. Since all ￿1-individuals are workers and
all ￿2-individuals are entrepreneurs in the equilibrium with migrations, some ￿1-individuals
who were entrepreneurs in country B before migrating are now workers in country A and
some ￿2-individuals who where workers before migrating are now entrepreneurs in country
B. Overall, allowing migrations increases the number of entrepreneurs (or ￿rms) in the two




1 ) > 0 and thus provided that the overall
population of ￿1-individuals is not too large as compared to ￿2-individuals.7
6Speci￿cally, j@G(￿1)=@(’2=’1)j < j@G(￿2)=@(’2=’1)j when ’2=’1 < 1.
7The change in the total number of ￿rms from allowing migrations is equal to the di⁄erence between the
number of entrepreneurs with migrations (’A
2 + ’B




9As soon as the parameters of the model are outside the range given in Proposition 1,
there cannot be two-way migrations. This implies that one-way migrations involve neither
too low, nor too similar migration costs. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 One-way migration of ￿1-individuals (x > 0; y = 0) is consistent with
the equilibrium in which the two countries fall in the intermediate case provided that c1 <
[￿2 ￿ ￿1]=2 and c2 ￿ [￿2=￿1][￿2 ￿ ￿1]=2. One-way migration of ￿2-individuals (x = 0; y > 0)
is consistent with the equilibrium in which the two countries fall in the intermediate case
provided that c1 ￿ [￿2 ￿ ￿1]=2 and c2 < [￿2=￿1][￿2 ￿ ￿1]=2. The ￿rst case requires c2 > c1
and the second case is consistent with c1 = c2 > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since c2 > c1 is needed for two-way migrations, it must be a fortiori the case when
only ￿1-individuals migrate. Similarly, there must be a relatively high migration cost c1
to discourage ￿1-individuals from migrating when x = 0. This explains why c1 = c2 is
consistent with this equilibrium. However since migration costs are positive when equal, the
two countries cannot become identical even in this case.
Other equilibria with migrations are possible. With higher migration costs for instance,
we could still have migration equilibria in which the two countries are less di⁄erent than in
the intial equilibrium but more di⁄erent than when both countries fall in the intermediate
case. Proposition 3 summarizes the possibilities.
Proposition 3 Given the equilibrium without migration in which country A has many tal-
ents and country B as few talents, allowing migrations of ￿1- and ￿2-individuals leads to two
additional equilibria: (i) A has still many talents and B falls in the intermediate case, and
(ii) A falls in the intermediate case and B has still few talents. These cases involve one-way
migrations of ￿1- or ￿2-individuals.
Proof. See the Appendix.
10All other combinations are inconsistent with an equilibrium with migrations8. Even if a
country stays the same type with migrations, changes do occur. For instance, from Section






1 + 1] entrepreneurs among ￿2-individuals so that
@￿2
@(’2=’1) < 0. Since ’A
2 =’A
1 falls with migrations, the proportion of entrepreneurs among ￿2-
individuals rises even if A remains a many-talent country. Similarly, when country B remains
a few-talent country with migrations, the proportion of entrepreneurs among ￿1-individuals















Hence, given the initial no-migration equilibrium in A and B, migrations always involve
both workers and entrepreneurs, and they make both countries more similar but never iden-
tical. In addition, an equilibrium with migrations requires that at least one country falls
in the intermediate case and that both do so when migrations are two ways. In all these
cases, industry structure in both countries is a⁄ected not only by migrations but also by
non-migrants￿changes in activities. In the next Section, we consider the implications of
these changes for the choice of migration policies.
4 Welfare, Voting and Migration Policies
To understand some of the policy implications of migrations, we ￿rst consider average welfare
per capita. For country i, the welfare index is measured by total earnings, that is pro￿t and
wage. The proportion of ￿2-individuals in the economy is zi
2 = ’i
2=hi, where hi is total





































8They are inconsistent with conditions (5) to (8). For instance, there is no migration when A (B) has
still many (few) ￿2-individuals. Similarly, migrations cannot make one or both countries become the other
country￿ s initial type.
11for the few-talent, the intermediate and the many-talent case. It is easy to check that average
welfare per capita increases with zi
2 up to the many-talent case where it is constant. This is
because total welfare is a positive convex combination of earnings. In the few-talent case,
most individuals have low earnings. In the many-talent case, all the ￿rms are run by the most
able entrepreneurs and all the workers earn as much as the entrepreneurs and more than in
the few-talent case.9 Since half the population is entrepreneurs, this case is characterized
by many small ￿rms. Clearly, if country i could select zi
2, it would always choose to be a
many-talent country and despite increasing returns to talent, ￿ small is beautiful￿ .
It is easy to extend the welfare analysis when migrations are allowed. With migrations,
the proportion of ￿2-individuals in the population changes in both countries such that zA
2 al-
ways falls and zB
2 always rises since zA
2 = (’A
2 ￿y)=(hA+x￿y) and zB
2 = (’B
2 +y)=(hB+y￿x).
The e⁄ect of migrations on average welfare per capita is immediate. Remembering that be-
fore migrations, B is a few-talent country, its average welfare per capita always increases
with migrations. In A, the average welfare per capita decreases except when A remains a
many talent country. Although it is a standard result in the literature that the country
attracting highly talented individuals (here ￿2-individuals) gains while the other one loses,
it is interesting to note that country A may not su⁄er from losing ￿2-individuals. This arises
because some non-migrating ￿2-individuals switch activities and maintain constant the pro-
portion of entrepreneurs in A￿ s population. Similarly, country B gains whether it attracts
￿2-individuals or whether it loses ￿1-individuals. This arises because migrations induce some
individuals in B also to switch activities in response to these migration patterns. However,
average welfare per capita does not take into account heterogeneity among individuals. Ac-
cordingly, we now consider the case where migration decisions are based on majority voting
and thus are determined by self interest.10
Recall that, when both countries belong to the intermediate case in the migration equilib-
9Hence, there is also an equal distribution of earnings. However, ￿2-entrepreneurs have higher earnings
in the few-talent and in the intermediate case.
10See Benhabib (1996), and Bilal, Grether and de Melo (2003) on median voter decisions with migrations
issues.
12rium, earnings change such that GA
0 (￿1) > GA(￿1); GA
0 (￿2) < GA(￿2), GB
0 (￿1) < GB(￿1) and
GB
0 (￿2) > GB(￿2). Hence, in A, ￿2-individuals prefer migration to no migration and, since
it is the many-talent country (￿A
0 = ’A
2 =’A
1 > 1), their choice re￿ ects the majority decision.




their choice also re￿ ects the majority vote. Whether migrations are one way or two ways,
the above earnings inequalities do not change and therefore, both countries always choose
to allow migrations when this decision is based on majority voting. This conclusion also
holds when one country remains in its inital range with migrations.11 This means that both
countries support migration policies be they about immigrants, emigrants or both. This
strong result arises because activity choices are endogenous and individual￿ s earnings are
linked whether they are workers, entrepreneurs, ￿1-type or ￿2￿ type individuals.
5 Conclusions
The paper has developed a simple two-country-one sector model where individuals are dif-
ferentiated according to two types of talent. The countries are di⁄erent in talent endowment
and all individuals choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. Allowing migrations generates
incentives for the relatively abundant type of individuals to migrate to the other country.
There are both workers and entrepreneurs among migrants and, depending on the parameters
of the model, there may be one-way or two-way migrations. Because the choice of activity
is endogenous, some individuals switch activities when crossing the border and migrations
induce some non-migrants to switch activities. As a result industry structure is sensitive
to migrations of talented individuals. Finally, the endogenous choice of activities and the
interdependance among individual￿ s earnings imply that if a country allows migrations, it
does not matter whether the migration policy is about immigrants, emigrants or both.
The model is admittedly simple but it captures some important sylized facts associated
11Since the other country necessarily falls in the intermediate case, the individuals bene￿ting from mi-
grations win the decision. Both countries choose to allow migrations but in one, individuals are indi⁄erent
between migration and no migration.
13with current patterns of migrations and in particular with brain circulation. It is also
su¢ ciently simple to be used to address more complex issues associated with contemporary
migration questions. For instance, the model could be expanded to investigate the links
between trade and migration ￿ ows by linking individuals￿types to di⁄erentiated products
(Manasse and Turrini, 2001; Yeaple, 2003). One could also increase the number of destination
countries to understand better why some countries, like the US, seem more successful at
attractings talented individuals than others. Finally, talent could be endogenized with the
introduction of human capital formation. These are only some of the issues that need
to be analyzed to understand the positive and normative aspects of brain circulation, a
phenomenon the importance of which is likely to keep growing.
6 Appendix:
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2:
i) x > 0; y = 0: Since A and B fall in the intermediate case, (￿1=￿2)




0 and 0 < ￿B
0 < (￿1=￿2)
2 < ￿B = ’B
2 =(’B
1 ￿x) < 1. In equilibrium, x is determined by




￿B = 2c1=￿2. Hence, ￿A ￿ ￿B when c1 ￿ 0. This case
also requires GA
0 (￿1) ￿ GB
0 (￿1) > c1; GB
0 (￿2) ￿ GA
0 (￿2) ￿ c2 and GB(￿2) ￿ GA(￿2) ￿ c2. It is
easy to check that GB(￿2)￿GA(￿2) < GB
0 (￿2)￿GA
0 (￿2) ￿ c2 so that the relevant parameters
are determined only by GB
0 (￿2) ￿ GA
0 (￿2) = (￿2 ￿ ￿1)(￿2=2￿1) ￿ c2 and GA
0 (￿1) ￿ GB
0 (￿1) =






0 (￿1) = ￿1￿2=4, GB
0 (￿2) ￿ GA
0 (￿2) = [￿2=2]
2 ￿
1=GB























0 (￿1) > c1 implies c2 ￿ GB
0 (￿2) ￿ GA
0 (￿2) > c1(￿2=￿1) and thus c2 > c1 ￿ 0.
ii) x = 0; y > 0: Since A and B fall in the intermediate case, (￿1=￿2)
2 < ￿A = (’A
2 ￿
y)=’A
1 < 1 < ￿A
0 and 0 < ￿B
0 < (￿1=￿2)
2 < ￿B = (’B
2 + y)=’B
1 < 1. In equilibrium, y is




￿A = 2c2=￿2. Hence, ￿A ￿ ￿B
when c2 ￿ 0: This case also requires GA
0 (￿1)￿GB
0 (￿1) ￿ c1; GB
0 (￿2)￿GA
0 (￿2) > c2; GA(￿1)￿
14GB(￿1) ￿ c1 and the relevant parameters are determined only by GA
0 (￿1)￿GB
0 (￿1) ￿ c1 and
GB
0 (￿2) ￿ GA
0 (￿2) > c2. Hence, c1 (c2) must be relatively low (high) but positive. As above,
GB
0 (￿2) ￿ GA
0 (￿2) = (￿2=￿1)
￿
GA
0 (￿1) ￿ GB
0 (￿1)
￿
so that c2 < GB
0 (￿2) ￿ GA
0 (￿2) ￿ (￿2=￿1)c1
which implies c2 < (￿2=￿1)c1: Thus, c1 = c2 is consistent with these inequalities as long as
they are positive.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose A has still many ￿2-individuals and B falls in the intermediate case with migrations.
This case implies 0 < ￿B
0 < (￿1=￿2)
2 < ￿B = (’B
2 + y)=(’B
1 ￿ x) < 1 < ￿A = (’A
2 ￿
y)=(’A
1 + x) < ￿A
0 with GA
0 (￿1) = GA(￿1) = GA
0 (￿2) = GA(￿2) = ￿2=2, GB
0 (￿1) = ￿1=2,
GB
0 (￿2) = (￿2=2)(￿2=￿1), GB(￿1) = (￿2=2)
p
￿B and GB(￿2) = (￿2=2)(1=
p
￿B). When x > 0
and y > 0, (7) and (8) can be written as 1 ￿
p
￿B = n1 and
p
￿B = c1=c2, which implies
that c2 = ￿2c1=(￿2 ￿ 2c1). This case almost never arises since this is the only possible
parameter combination. When x > 0 and y = 0, 1 ￿
p
￿B = n1 determines x: Among the
three inequalities that must also hold, only GA
0 (￿1)￿GB
0 (￿1) > c1 and GB
0 (￿2)￿GA
0 (￿2) ￿ c2
matter. They are c2 > (￿2=2￿1)(￿2￿￿1) and (1=2)(￿2￿￿1) > c1 implying that c2 > c1. When
x = 0 and y > 0, 1=
p
￿B ￿1 = n2 determines y uniquely. Among the three inequalities that
must hold in equilibrium, only GA
0 (￿1) ￿ GB
0 (￿1) ￿ c1 and GB
0 (￿2) ￿ GA
0 (￿2) > c2 matter so
that c1 = c2 is consistent with the equilibrium. The proof for the case in which A falls in
the intermediate case and B has still few ￿2-individuals is similar.
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